

# THE MILITARY MONITOR,

AND

## AMERICAN REGISTER.

"THE PUBLIC GOOD OUR END."

Vol. I.]

MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1813.

[No. 21.]

### THE MILITARY MONITOR, AND AMERICAN REGISTER, By T. O'CONNOR,

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NEW-YORK, 1812.

### Official.

#### DOCUMENTS

*Accompanying the President's Message to Congress.*

(CONTINUED.)

#### MR. RUSSELL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

*Washington, Nov. 16, 1812.*

SIR—I have the honor to hand you here with an account of the conversation alluded to in a postscript to my letter of the 19th of September, and which I had not sufficient time then to copy.

I have the honor to be, with great consideration and respect, sir, your obedient servant.

JONA. RUSSELL.

*The hon. James Monroe, Esq. &c. &c.*

#### MR. RUSSELL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

*London, September 17, 1812.*

SIR—On the 12th inst. I had the honor to receive your letter of the 27th of July last—I called immediately at the foreign office to prepare lord Castlereagh, by imparting to him the nature and extent of my instructions, for the communication which it became me to make to him. His lordship was in the country and I was obliged to write to him without previously seeing him. I

however accompanied my official note (A\*) with a private letter (B) offering explanation, if required, and soliciting dispatch.

I waited until three o'clock, the 16th inst. without hearing from his lordship, when I was surprised at receiving a note (C) from Mr. Hamilton, indefinitely postponing an official reply.

To give more precision to the transaction I immediately addressed to him my answer (D) and before dinner, at 5 o'clock on the same day, I received an invitation (E) from lord Castlereagh to meet him at his house that evening at nine o'clock.

I waited on his lordship, at the time appointed, in company with Mr. Hamilton, at a table loaded with the records of American correspondence, which they appeared to have been examining.

I was courteously received, and after a conversation of a few minutes on different subjects, I led the way to the business on which I came, by observing that I had once more been authorised to present the olive branch, and hoped it would not be again rejected.

His lordship observed that, he had desired the interview to ascertain, before he submitted my communication of the 13th to the prince regent, the form and nature of the power under which I acted. To satisfy him at once on both these points, I put into his hands your letter of the 27th of July. I the more willingly adopted this mode of procedure as, besides the confidence which its frankness was calculated to produce, the letter itself would best define my authority, and prove the moderation and conciliatory temper of my government.

His lordship read it attentively—he then commented at some length both on the shape and substance of my power. With regard to the former he observed, that all my authority was contained in a letter from the secretary of state,

which, as my diplomatic functions had ceased, appeared but a scanty foundation on which to place the important arrangement I had been instructed to propose. With regard to the extent of my powers, he could not perceive that they essentially differed from those under which I had brought forward the propositions contained in my note of the 24th August. He considered that to enter with me into the understanding, required as a preliminary to a convention for an armistice, he would be compelled to act on unequal ground, as from his situation he must necessarily pledge his government, when, from the nature of my authority, I could give no similar pledge for mine. He could not, therefore, think of committing the British faith and leave the American government free to disregard its engagements. Besides it did not appear to him that, at the date of my last instructions the revocation of the orders in council on the 23d of June, had been received at Washington, and that great hopes were entertained of the favorable effect such intelligence would produce there.

The question of impressment, he went on to observe, was attended with difficulties of which neither I nor my government appeared to be aware.—“Indeed,” he continued “there has evidently been much misapprehension on this subject, and an erroneous belief entertained that arrangement, in regard to it, has been nearer an accomplishment than the facts will warrant. Even our friends in congress, I mean.” (observing perhaps some alteration in my countenance) “those who are opposed to going to war with us, have been so confident in this mistake, that they have ascribed the failure of such an arrangement solely to the misconduct of the American government. This error probably originated with Mr. King, for being much esteemed here, and always



well received by the persons then in power, he seems to have misconstrued their readiness to listen to his representations, and their warm professions of a disposition to remove the complaints of America, in relation to impressment, into a supposed conviction on their part of the propriety of adopting the plan which he had proposed. But lord St. Vincent, whom he might have thought he had brought over to his opinions, appears never for a moment to have ceased to regard all arrangement on the subject to be attended with formidable, if not insurmountable, obstacles. This is obvious from a letter which his lordship addressed to sir William Scott at that time."

Here lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained in the records before him, in which lord St. Vincent states to sir William Scott, the zeal with which Mr. King had assailed him on the subject of impressment, confesses his own perplexity and total incompetency to discover any practical project for the safe discontinuance of that practice, and asks for council and advice. "Thus you see," proceeded lord Castlereagh, "that the confidence of Mr. King on this point was entirely unfounded."

The extreme difficulty, if not total impracticability of any satisfactory arrangement for the discontinuance of impressment is most clearly manifested by the result of the negotiation carried on between Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, and lords Auckland and Holland. The doctrines of which these noblemen had been the advocates, when in opposition, bound them by all the force of consistency to do everything under their commission for the satisfaction of America relative to impressment, which the subject would possibly admit. There were many circumstances on that occasion peculiarly propitious to an amicable arrangement on this point, had such an arrangement been at all attainable.—Both parties accordingly appear to have exhausted their ingenuity in attempting to devise expedients satisfactorily to perform the office of impressment, and nothing can more conclusively demonstrate the inherent difficulty of the matter, and the utter impossibility of finding the expedient which they sought, than that all their labors, pursued on that occasion with unexampled diligence cordiality and good faith, should have been in vain."

His lordship now turned to a letter in a volume before him, addressed at the close of the negotiation by these commissioners to the American ministers, conceived in the kindest spirit of conciliation, in which they profess the most earnest desire to remove all causes of

complaint on the part of America concerning impressment, regret that their endeavours had hitherto been ineffectual, lament the necessity of continuing the practice, and promise to provide as far as possible against the abuse of it.

"If," resumed his lordship, "this was the result of a negotiation entertained under circumstances so highly favorable, where the powers and the disposition of the parties were limited only by the difficulties of the subject, what reasonable expectation can be encouraged that in the actual state of things, with your circumscribed and imperfect authority, we can come to a more successful issue? I shall have to proceed in so weighty a concern with the utmost deliberation and circumspection; and it will be necessary for me to consult the great law-officers of the crown. You are not aware of the great sensibility and jealousy of the people of England on this subject, no administration could expect to remain in power that should consent to renounce the right of impressment, or to suspend the practice, without the certainty of an arrangement which should obviously be calculated most unequivocally to secure its object.—Whether such arrangement can be devised is extremely doubtful, but it is very certain that you have not sufficient powers for its accomplishment."

Such was the substance, and, in many parts, the language, of his lordship's discourse. To which I replied, that the main object of my powers being to effect a suspension of hostilities, their form could not be material. It was sufficient that they emanated from a competent authority and were distinctly and clearly conferred. That in requiring as a condition to an armistice, a clear understanding relative to impressment and other points of controversy between the two countries, it was intended merely to lay the basis of an amicable adjustment, and thereby to diminish the probability of a renewal of hostilities. To come to such an understanding, to be in itself informal, and which expressly left the details of the points which it embraced, to be discussed and adjusted by commissioners to be hereafter appointed, was certainly within the instructions which I had received, and I could, of course, thus far pledge my government for its observance.

I did not acknowledge the force of his objection, predicated on the inequality of our respective powers, nor perceive how the British faith would be particularly committed. The faith of both governments would be equally committed, for whatever was done under their respective authority; and

although his lordship might have power to go beyond the armistice and understanding for which I was instructed, yet there was no necessity for doing so, and while we acted within those limits we stood on equal ground. And were it otherwise, yet as the promise of the one party would be the sole consideration for the promise of the other, should either fail in the performance of its engagements, the other would necessarily be discharged, and the imputation of bad faith could alone attach to the first delinquent.

Nor was I dismayed at the very formidable difficulties with which he had thought proper to array the subject of impressment, and although willing to acknowledge my inferiority to the American negociators who had preceded me in the matter, yet I was not disposed on account of their failure to shrink from the discharge of a duty imposed on me by my government. To me, indeed, the whole question appeared much less alarming than his lordship had described it to be. And that if Mr. King had really been mistaken with regard to the near completion of an adjustment, his lordship must on an attention to the *whole correspondence* at the time, acquit him from the imputation of any excessive want of penetration.

As to the supposed ignorance in America of the revolution of the orders in council, at the time my instructions were dated, I observed, that if this ignorance did in fact exist, yet from certain expressions in those instructions, an expectation of such a measure seems to have been confidently entertained, and the orders in council appeared no longer to form an obstacle to a conciliation. However this might be, it ought not to be supposed that the American government would be ready to abandon one main point for which it contended, merely because it had obtained another, which was generally considered to be of minor importance, and to submit to the continuance of impressment on account of the discontinuance of the orders in council. At any rate, having authorised me to propose terms of accommodation here, it would probably wait for information concerning the manner in which they have been received, before it would consent to more unfavorable conditions. In the mean time, the war would be prosecuted, and might produce new obstacles to a pacific arrangement. I was happy to learn that the failure of a former negotiation concerning impressment could not be ascribed to a want of sincerity and moderation in the American government; and I



hoped the mode now suggested for securing to Great Britain her own seamen, might remove the difficulties which had hitherto embarrassed this question. If the people of England were so jealous and sensitive with regard to this harsh practice, what ought to be the feeling of the people of America who were the victims of it? In the United States this practice of impressment was considered as bearing a strong resemblance to the slave trade, aggravated indeed in some of its features, as the negro was purchased already bereft of his liberty, and his slavery and exile were at least mitigated by his exemption from danger, by the interested forbearance of his task master, and the consciousness that if he could no longer associate with those who were dear to him, he was not compelled to do them injury—while the American citizens is torn without price, at once from all the blessings of freedom and all the charities of social life, subjected to military law, exposed to incessant perils, and forced at times to hazard his life in despoiling or destroying his kindred and countrymen. It was matter of astonishment that while Great Britain discovered such zeal for the abolition of the traffic in the barbarous and unbelieving natives of Africa, as to endeavor to force it on her reluctant allies, that she should so obstinately adhere to the practice of impressing American citizens, whose civilization, religion & blood, so obviously demanded a more favorable distinction.

I next pointed out to his lordship the difference between the propositions which I now submitted, and those contained in my note of the 24th of August. That although the object of both was essentially the same, there was great diversity in the manner of obtaining it. The discontinuance of the practice of impressment, which was before required to be immediate, and to constitute a formal preliminary to an armistice, was now deferred to commence contemporaneously with the law of the United States prohibiting the employment of British seamen, and was consigned, with the other conditions, to a separate and informal arrangement. In this way it was no doubt intended, by respecting the feelings of the British government, to obviate any objection which might have been the mere suggestion of its pride.

I finally offered, in order to answer at once the observations and enquiries of lord Castlereagh, that the proposed understanding should be expressed in the most general terms—that the laws, to take effect on the discontinuance of

the practice of impressment, should the employment of native subjects or citizens of the one state, excepting such only as have already been naturalized, on board the private and public ships of the other—thus removing any objection that might have been raised with regard to the future effect of naturalization or the formal renunciation of any pretended right. With regard to blockades, I proposed to follow the same course—and only to agree that none should be instituted by either party which were not conformable to the acknowledged laws of nations—leaving the definition of such blockades, and all other details, to be settled by the commissioners in the definitive treaty.

I was disappointed and grieved to find that these propositions, moderate and liberal as they were, should be treated in a manner which forbid me to expect their acceptance. I was even asked, by Mr. Hamilton, if the United States would deliver up the native British seamen who might be naturalized in America!—Although shocked at this demand, I mildly replied that such a procedure would be disgraceful to America without being useful to Great Britain—that the habits of seamen were so peculiarly unaccommodating that no one would patiently go through the long probation, required by law, to become the citizen of a country where he could not pursue his professional occupations—and that not to employ him in his way would be virtually to surrender him to G. Britain.

I was disposed to believe, however, that a reciprocal arrangement might be made for giving up deserters from public vessels.

Here, perhaps, I owe an apology to my government, for having, without its precise commands, hazarded the overture above mentioned, relative to British subjects who may hereafter become citizens of the United States. In taking this step however, I persuaded myself that I did not trespass against the spirit of the instructions which I had received; and had the proposition been accepted, I should not have been without all hope that it would have been approved by the president, as its prospective operation would have prevented injustice, and its reciprocity disgrace.—Should I, however, urged by too great a zeal to produce an accommodation, have mistaken herein the intentions of the president I still should have derived some consolation from reflecting that this proposition, thus frankly and explicitly made, afforded an opportunity of satisfactorily testing the disposition of this government, and might be useful in

removing much misconception and error.

The refusal of this proposition sufficiently explains the view with which I was assailed with the ostentatious parade of the abortive negotiations relative to impressment; the exaggerations of its pretended difficulties; the artificial solemnity given to its character; the affected sensibility of the popular sentiment, concerning it; and the fastidious exception taken to my powers, and proves most unequivocally the predetermination of the British government to reject, at this time, every overture for the discontinuance of this degrading practice.

Most unfeignedly desiring to suspend the existing hostilities between the two states with a reasonable prospect of finally terminating them in a manner honorable to both, I perhaps pressed with too much earnestness the adoption of the arrangement which I was instructed to propose; for lord Castlereagh once observed, somewhat loftily, that if the American government was so anxious to get rid of the war it would have an opportunity of doing so on learning the revocation of the orders in council.

I felt constrained on this occasion to assure his lordship that, the anxiety of the American government to get rid of the war, was only a proof of the sincerity with which it has constantly sought to avoid it, but that no event has occurred, it was apprehended, to increase this anxiety. His lordship, correcting his manner, rejoined, that it was not his intention to say any thing offensive, but merely to suggest that if the American government sincerely wished for a restoration of the friendly relations between the two countries, it would consider the revocation of the orders in council as affording a fair occasion for the attainment of that object.

After a pause of a few moments he added, that if the United States did not avail themselves of this occasion, not only to put an end to the war, which they had declared, but to perform the condition on which those orders were revoked that the orders would, of course revive, I could not forbear to remind his lordship, that when I took this view of the subject, in my note of the 24th of August, he had found it to be incorrect; but I hoped that now I was so fortunate as to agree with him on this point, some provision would be made, in case the terms proposed for an armistice should be accepted, to prevent the revival of those edicts. His lordship attempted



to explain, but I could not distinctly seize his meaning.

The conversation ended with an assurance on the part of his lordship, that he would, with as little delay as possible, communicate officially to me the decision of the prince regent, and I took my leave, forbidden to hope that, while the present councils and the present opinion of the American people prevail here, this decision will be favorable.

I have the honor to be, with great consideration and respect, sir, your faithful obedient servant.

JONA. RUSSEL.

Copy of a letter from capt. Jones, late of the U. States sloop of war Wasp, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated New-York, Nov. 24, 1810.

SIR—I here avail myself of the first opportunity of informing you of the occurrences of our cruise, which terminated in the capture of the Wasp on the 18th Oct. by the Poictiers of 74 guns, while a wreck from damages received in an engagement with the British sloop of war Frolic of twenty-two guns; sixteen of them thirty-two pound carronades, and four twelve pounders on the main deck, and two 12 pounders, carronades, on the top-gallant forecastle, making her superior in force to us by four twelve pounders. The Frolic had struck to us and was taken possession of about two hours before our surrendering to the Poictiers.

We had left the Delaware on the 12th. The 16th had a heavy gale, in which we lost our jibboom and two men. Half past 11 on the night of the 17th, in the lat. of 37 deg. N. and long. 65 deg. W. we saw several sail, two of them appearing very large; we stood from them for some time, then shortened sail and steered the remainder of the night the course we had perceived them on. At daylight on Sunday the 18th we saw them ahead—gave chase and soon discovered them to be a convoy of six sail under the protection of the sloop of war, four of them large ships mounting from 16 to 18 guns. At 32 minutes past 4, A. M. we engaged the sloop of war, having first received her fire at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space we gradually lessened until we laid her on board, after a well supported fire of 43 minutes; and although so near while loading the last broadside that our rammers touched the side of the enemy, our men exhibited the same alacrity which they had done during the whole of the action. They immediately surrendered upon our gaining their forecas-

le, so that no loss was sustained on either side after boarding.

Our main-top was shot away between 4 and 5 minutes from the commencement of the firing, and falling together with the main-top sail yard across the larboard fore and fore-top-sail braces, rendered our head yards unmanageable the remainder of the action. At 8 minutes the gaff and mizen-top-gallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes from the beginning of the action every brace and most of the rigging shot away. A few minutes after separating from the Frolic both her masts fell upon deck, the mainmast going close by the deck and the foremast twelve or fifteen feet above the deck.

The courage and exertions of the officers and crew fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieut. Biddle's active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact attention paid to every department during the engagement, and the animating example afforded the crew by his intrepidity. Lieuts. Bodgers and Booth, and Mr. Rapp, shewed by the incessant fire from their divisions that they were not to be surpassed in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight and every other officer acted with a courage and promptitude highly honorable, and I trust I have given assurance that they may be relied on whenever their services may be required.

I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, as many of the dead lay buried under the masts and spars that had fallen upon deck, which two hours exertion had not sufficiently removed. Mr. Biddle, who, had charge of the Frolic, states from what he saw and from information from the officers, the number of killed must have been about 30, and that of the wounded about 40 or 50—of the killed are her first lieutenant and sailing master, of the wounded capt. Whinyates and her second lieutenant.

We have 5 killed and 5 wounded, as per list; the wounded are recovering. Lieut. Claxton, who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement, and though too weak to be at his division, remained upon deck and shewed by his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer. I am respectfully, yours,

JAMES JONES.

The Hon. Paul Hamilton,  
Secretary of the Navy.

#### STATE OF NEW-YORK.

##### GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-Quarters, New-York, Nov. 28, 1812.

The uniform troops, lately commanded by lieut. colonel Robert Swartwout,

having faithfully performed their tour of duty on the southern frontier of this state have been discharged with the flattering encomiums of the commanding general, & have returned into the body of the militia. In justice to the officers and soldiers of that meritorious corps, and to his own feelings, the commander in chief announces his entire approbation of their patriotic conduct and services; and his sincere thanks for their prompt and unanimous compliance with the first call of their country, that promptitude and unanimity, and their correct, orderly and soldierly deportment, and their assiduous attention to, and extensive improvement in military science, and in all the accomplishments, and duties of the patriot soldier, have distinguished them as generous and public defenders of the nation, and entitle them to public applause and gratitude. By order of the Commander in Chief.

WM. PAULDING, jr.  
Adjutant-gen.

#### GENERAL ORDERS.

##### ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE.

Washington City, 27th Nov. 1812.

Certain publications having appeared in the news-papers, giving information in detail of the strength and probable objects of the armies to which the writers are said to belong; which information, if true, is calculated to apprise the enemy of the real strength; if is correct, to mislead the public mind: it has become necessary to put a stop to all such publications in future, by reminding the officers and soldiers of the army, that all communications relative to their duties, or to the public service, should be made to their immediate commanding officers, and forbidding them to correspond on these subjects with any other persons, reserving to all concerned the rights secured to them by the rules and articles of war.

By order of the Secretary of War.  
T. H. CUSHING, Adj. General.

#### FOR THE MILITARY MONITOR.

### Defence of New-York.

#### No. XIV.

A considerable saving would accrue to each corps from the reduction of supernumerary musicians, and the abolition of every superfluous ornament of dress. I am no enemy to the use of music, but; a practice, or drill it should only be introduced occasionally to regulate the time of march and aid the men in acquiring the proper cadence. The length of pace must be



habitual and not made to depend on the adventitious aid of music, the sound of which can seldom be heard amidst the din of battle.

In the neighbourhood of an enemy it may become necessary to make a secret movement, which will require many precautions, to prevent its being known by an adversary vigilant & ever watchful to seize every opportunity that offers for his advantage; hence, music would be the best means of putting him on his guard and apprising him of your intentions.

But, when it becomes necessary to raise the spirits of the men, particularly on a march, or in rallying, music offers a powerful aid & can always be employed with effect. In our present practice, we must have it on every occasion, and a dozen men cannot assemble in a tavern or dancing room to exercise a wooden field piece or walk paces of twelve or fourteen inches without the aid of drums and fifes, and often of a full band.

Thus preferring sound to sense; and quackery to experience, & for the sake of the former neglecting to embrace the proper means of instruction which can never be afforded except by those who have been instructed. I have heard of "heaven born Generals" as well as "heaven born ministers" but, the detail of a battallion must be learned—it is of no extraordinary nature, and does not require the intervention of inspiration.

The dress of officers is too expensive, and ought to be reformed—an economical regulation on this head is much wanted, and would materially benefit the service. The dress of the Cossacks furnishes a model which a Republican Militia might imitate with advantage.

A round hat should replace the present proposterous "chapeau bras"—The coat might very well spare its swallow-tailed skirts, and be more useful in the shape of a jacket or coattee.—The sash reduced to one third its present size would be equally useful; and a plain sabre in strong leather scabbard slung in a black or buff waistbelt, would certainly be a more effective weapon for offence or defence, than the shewey blades which now dangle in gingerbread scabbards and gold stitched morocco at the sides of "Military men".

All parade is useless—it serves only "to ensnare the vulgar" and excite the contempt or ridicule of the well informed.

Thus, I hope, I have shown, that in the articles of sound and morocco leather, tassels and feathers, as much might be annually saved in each corps as would contribute materially to remun-

rate a capable Adjutant for devoting the principal part of his time to the instruction of the officers and men of his regiment. Such men are necessary to the well being of the Militia, though they were hardly thought of on a recent occasion where their services would have been found all important; yet there were field officers sufficient for an establishment of double the effective force embodied.

We have cotton spinners from Europe to instruct us in spinning cotton; weavers, and other manufacturers to teach us their respective arts; nay, we have dancing masters to teach us cotillions and waltzes—We are not ashamed to learn these things from foreigners we hesitate not to confess our ignorance of them;—this is right, why then should we continue wilfully stupid alone in what relates to the military art? or why persecute as in the case of Colonel Dela Croix men capable of doing us service. To ourselves, solely, we must look for defence. To render this defence effectual, we must learn in time, and no longer fancy that Military knowledge can be as easily acquired as a commission.

The militia of Switzerland, like ours, consists of the whole people. They were formerly the bravest in Europe; nor do the fatal events of 1802 tend to depreciate the martial character of a nation which had so nobly combatted the whole force of Austria and immortalized itself on the fields of Morgarten.

Who is there that ever visited Switzerland, has described a Swiss standard-bearer as dressed in an uniform of one or two hundred dollars price.

It is only within the last few years, during the worst period of their history, that they have begun to imitate the Military fripperies of their royal and imperial neighbours.

Even the British are daily becoming more simple in their military attire—In the cavalry they have laid aside epaulettes altogether, and in one of their best regiments of infantry the 95th, lace or epaulettes are equally unknown. Yet in their whole army there is not a battalion of more martial or imposing appearance, or that has behaved better on actual service. In military bodies, uniformity is elegance.

In the campaign of the British under sir John Moore in Spain, and which ended in their expulsion from that country at Corunna; it was ascertained that most of the sabre wounds received by their cavalry, were about the head, owing, as it is acknowledged to the nature of their conical leather caps, or Kevenhüller hats, which though ornamental on a parade or at a review, were found

to be useless on actual service. Their opponents on the contrary suffered but little on the head or face, being so well defended by their brass helmets which were rendered sword proof by means of several iron bars or plates that intersected them inside.

The British wisely profiting by experience have since adopted similar helmets, and perhaps improved them. They have also laid aside their weighty war saddle; and, in imitation of their enemy, now make it a part of the duty of their dragoons to construct lighter saddles, which can be taken asunder in the field, packed in bales, and reunited at pleasure.

The introduction of the lance into the British cavalry service, immediately after they experienced its dreadful effects, even against columns of infantry at Albuera, show that they are not ashamed to learn wisdom from their enemies: neither should we, though, in so doing we should be considered only as second hand imitators.

AMICUS.

## The Military Monitor.

NEW-YORK,

MONDAY MORNING, JANUARY 18, 1813.

### SUBSCRIBERS

To the MILITARY MONITOR, are respectfully reminded that, according to the terms of publication, there is now due from each Subscriber, who has not paid *any thing*, \$2, and from each of those who have paid \$1, there is another due—each subscriber in arrear it is hoped will immediately forward the amount he may owe—the sum is so very trifling, THEY cannot feel it, but the whole amounts to a sum so considerable, that the Editor would be greatly benefited by the receipt of it.

To those who have forwarded a years subscription in advance, the Editor returns his grateful acknowledgements, such liberality, if it was more general would enable him to meet with ease, a considerable expense, soon to be met, for engraving, &c.

He does not require this of any of his subscribers, but where it is convenient, he will be very grateful for the favour. The 4 first numbers will be published in the present month, and forwarded to subscribers. If any subscribers have not received their papers regularly, they will please to give notice at the Printing Office, and their future delivery will be attended to, if any number has not been received by any of his friends, the editor by being made acquainted with it and the papers wanting, if desired will supply them.

Persons desirous of becoming subscribers are informed they can be supplied with all the numbers published.

Those subscribers who have never made us a remittance, and who neglect to do so after receiving this notice, will, in every case have their papers discontinued. Justice to ourselves will compel us to have recourse to this disagreeable measure.



**FASCINES**, are faggots of small wood, about six feet long, and one foot in diameter, A bound in the middle and at both ends.


They are brought by the cavalry to the entrance of the trenches, whence they are carried by the workmen to raise batteries or other works; or to fill up the moat or any chasm that renders the approaches to the wall difficult, and are covered with earth or raw hides to prevent their being set on fire.

In fortification, they are used to bind the ramparts where they are laid athwart and drove down with stakes C. with a bed of earth above them,—earth and fascines alternately till the rampart is finished.

When used to keep up the earth, or line the parapet, they are laid length ways and drove fast with stakes of 3 or 4 feet long, there are shorter fascines or Bavins, about 18 inches long, which, being pitched over are used to set galleries or other works of the enemy on fire.

Fascines differ from saucissons, the former being made of small wood, and the latter of branches of trees. B.

Fascines are often carried by the cavalry before a march over bad ground, to repair the roads and render the passage easy to infantry.



**POWER.**—It has been frequently asserted that the President of the United States, has as much power as the king of England without pretending to specify the entire extent of the king's power, or the wide difference between it and that of the Presidents, let the following suffice at present.

*The King of England* owes his power to the chance of birth, and is king for life, he appoints at his own discretion, and free from the controul of any other authority, all officers civil and military, except some minor officers who are appointed by his creatures, he appoints all Bishops in the established church. He appoints the sheriffs, he creates all the

members of one of the houses of the legislature and increases the number at his will, no law can be enacted without his concurrence. He may declare war, and conclude peace, he may dissolve the peoples, house of parliament, the law declares that he cannot do wrong, and, of course he is not responsible for his acts in other words, *he is infalible*.

*The President of the United States* derives his power from the people, and his term of office is limited to four years, unless he should be re-elected, his appointments of civil, and military officers, are subject to the control and reversal of a branch of the legislature which is chosen by the people, laws may be enacted notwithstanding his dissent, he cannot declare war without the concurrence of Congress he can neither prorogue or dissolve Congress, he is accountable for his conduct, and *may be impeached*.

We understand, that so far from propositions of peace being carried out in the cartel *Catherine Ray*, from our government to England, the messenger bears a proper remonstrance against the conduct of the British towards persons employed in our Military and Naval service, who have had the misfortune of falling into their hands, as prisoners of war, and whom they have detained as "natural born subjects"—The determination of our government, in case the British injure any of those taken fighting under the American flag, is positively to *retaliate*.

## Summary.

The last advices from Portugal fully confirm the former accounts of the retreat of the British, and give us the additional information of the re-capture of Madrid by the French, whence Lord Wellington retired to Salamanca.

If any thing short of the British army being captured can convince the cabinet of St. James, of their folly in prosecuting the present mad war on the Peninsula, it certainly must be the result of the late Spanish campaign.

Their operations in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, commenced with the defeat of Marmont, one of the most celebrated of the captains of Napoleon. This victory was not a barren one, producing only the honours of a well fought field; it involved in its consequences, the flight of king Joseph from the capital; its occupation by the British, the abandonment of Seville, and the raising of the siege of Cadiz, after a protracted siege of a duration unequalled, except

in one instance, in the annals of modern warfare, and at a moment when the labours of years were about to be crowned with success.

The army of France daily diminished by the capture of numerous detachments and small garrisons, seemed to have no choice but to die with arms in their hands, as the superiority of the foe rendered vain all hopes of victory.

If ever the English commander had cause to indulge himself in rational hopes of success, it must be at such a period, when even the Ebro could oppose but a feeble barrier to his triumphant progress, & France drained of her veteran legions combatting on the banks of the Niemen, two thousand miles distant, could send only conscript reinforcements beyond the Pyrennes.

Lord Wellington's usual caution seems now to have forsaken him; and for the first time in his military career he attempts rapid movements—and pushes on to Burgos, to which he lays siege with as much *non chalance*, as if his enemies were natives of India.

But, the Gallic chieftains, were not Mahrattas, neither were their soldiers Hindoos. Relinquishing as usual the pursuit of minor objects—they unite; and British triumph thenceforth ceases. The siege of Burgos is raised, and he who triumphantly entered Madrid a few weeks before, now retreats in disgrace, leaving his sick, his wounded, & his cannon in the hands of his enemies.

Within the last six years the French have built a fleet of 24 sail of the line besides frigates at Antwerp.

It is not more than twenty years since the entrance of vessels from the sea was prohibited to this city, then part of the dominions of the Emperor of Germany.

The government of Holland, jealous of its maritime situation and apprehensive of its successfully rivalling Amsterdam if foreign commerce was permitted to her merchants, obtained by treaty the exclusive navigation of the Scheldt, and consequently excluded their neighbours of Antwerp from all participations in its benefits below fort Lillo, where a Dutch guard ship was constantly stationed to prevent any infraction of the treaty. When Dumourier invaded the Netherlands the national convention of France justly restored Antwerp to her rights by opening the Scheldt to the mercantile enterprizes of all those who had a natural claim to any share in their benefits. The late William Pitt was well aware of the importance of Antwerp as a naval station; its contiguity to the mouth of the Thames, and the great extent of inland navigation of which it could be made the convergent point, to-



gether with the vast resources of naval stores afforded from the interior by an easy communication, all tended to impress on the mind of this statesman, the absolute necessity of England interfering to prevent the whole importance of Antwerp from being discovered: Hence, the willingness of the English Ministry to enter into the coalition as *allies* of the Dutch, whilst in fact, the war was solely for English objects,—and has continued to be waged solely on these accounts with little intermission to the present day.

But, alas! how are the mighty fallen! and the humble exalted!—The United provinces now from an integral part of the French empire. Finishing destroyed by the English in the autumn of 1809, at an expence of millions of money and thousands of lives, sacrificed in the pestiferous fens of Walchern, or who subsequently fell victims to the disorder, contracted in this European Batavia, now contains a powerful squadron destined to avenge the injuries inflicted on the Dutch marine by England the modern Carthage. Britain driven from the continent, subsidizes the Samoeides and Lusitanians, the Calmucks and the Castilians; the Goths and the Greeks to unite in *her* cause, and thus, put off for a while, that catastrophe which is only wanting to restore peace to Europe and America.

## Extracts.

### CONSPIRACY IN PARIS.

LONDON, NOV. 13.—The following has been communicated by a gentleman recently arrived from Paris, as the statement circulated by the Members of the French government, for the information of their private friends, as to the nature, extent, and termination of the late conspiracy:

"The three Ex. Generals Mallet, Guidall and Lahorie, already sentenced and executed, endeavoured to bring about a new revolution in Paris.

"They made use of a fictitious *Senatus Consultum*, by means of which they succeeded in deceiving the garrison of Paris. Having gone on the 23d of Oct. at four o'clock in the morning to the barracks occupied by the first division, and the dragoons of Paris, they read to them a proclamation, in which they informed them of the death of the Emperor, on the 7th, and ordered them in the name of the Regent to follow them.

"The troops believing what was told them, obeyed their orders, and suffered themselves to be led to different

posts, where they relieved the guards—and at 7 in the morning presented themselves at the Minister's of the General Police, and the Prefect's of the Police, both of whom they arrested, and carried them to the Prison of Laforce, under the escort of 300 men.

"Mean while another division proceeded to the house of the Commandant of Paris General Hullin (not Savary) Mallet informed him, that he was no longer Commandant; and on Hullin hesitating to resign his command, a pistol was discharged at him, by Mallet, which mortally wounded him in the head.

"Mallet next proceeded to the Chief of the Etat Major of Paris, to arrest him; but this officer (who appears to have been apprized of his danger) had several officers in his apartment, who, proving too powerful for Mallet, arrested him; they then harrangued the troops, who followed him, and having succeeded in persuading them that Mallet was a conspirator, & that the Emperor was not dead, the whole laid down their arms. The troops cantoned at Versailles and gross Bois were now sent for, and the barriers having been shut, the conspirators were arrested.

"At two o'clock, the Minister of Police and the Prefect were liberated, the Officers of the first division, were arrested, and the troops sent out to Paris.

"On the first report of the Emperor's death, which the conspirators spread all over Paris, the Bank was surrounded by a multitude, who endeavoured to exchange their notes for specie; but in a short time, order and tranquillity were restored and every thing quiet."

*The Prince Regent*—I have lately met with a pamphlet published in London in 1795, addressed to the House of Lords on a motion made in the house to pay that Prince's debts then amounting to 800,000l. sterling.

By this pamphlet, it appears that this Prince had expended 190,000l. sterling in 4 years after he became of age, besides 74,000l. sterling his allowance viz. 50,000l. granted by Parliament. 18,000 from Cornwall as its Duke, and 6000l. as Prince of Wales. Thus in 4 years he had expended 486,000l. sterling equal to dolls. 3,160,000 at the rate of dolls. 1,500 per day.

To enable this Prince to support his dignity as heir to the crown—Parliament in 1787 voted him 10,000l. sterling in addition, making his income 84,000l. annually. Yet in 1795, 7 years after, an application is again made to Parliament to pay the debt of 800,000l. sterling. Thus in 7 year he had ex-

pendent—

As by his new debts	800,000
84,000, his annual income—	
In 7 years	588,000

11,388,009

which in dolls. 6,170, 000, or dolls. 2, 400 per day.

From the early life of this hopeful Prince, he had been noted by his company with Horse Jockeys—Pimps—Bawds and Gamblers—with him the conjugal tie was a mere thread to be broken with every object that excited his sensibility.

With a Revenue equal to the whole of the United States' Civil List, this Prince has expended and made debts for the Kingdom to pay over his income 990,000l. sterling in 10 years. Is this the man that is to save a thinking nation?

It may be recollected the attempt made in 1806 to prove the infidelity of the Princess of Wales and her honorable acquittal by the committee of lord Erskine and others.

In a second attempt lately and acquitted—when it cost the nation 100,000l. sterling to suppress Mr. Percival's statement of these facts, so disgraceful to this Prince and his party.

We can recollect the conduct of the Duke of York, and Mrs. Clark—the intrigues of this family as stated by Mrs. Clark, and the 20,000l. to suppress her publications.

We can recollect the 50,000l. the Prince of Wales expended at a supper soon after he became the Regent.

These are only a part of the items, this hopeful family have cost the British nation.—*Dem. Press.*

*From the Republican Constellation.*

### LOWER CANADA.

*Extent.*—Lower Canada lies between 61 and 71 deg. W. and between 45 and 52 N. Its greatest length from east to west is 800 miles. Its greatest breadth is about 450 miles: though the average breadth is said to be not more than 350.

*Boundaries.*—Bounded N. by New-Britain; E. by New-Britain and the gulf of St. Laurence; S. by New-Brunswick, Maine, New-Hamshire, Vermont, New-York, and Upper Canada; W. by Upper Canada.

The division between Upper and Lower Canada commences at a stone boundary on the north bank of the lake St. Francis, in the river St. Lawrence, at the cove west of Pointe au Boudet, and pursues a northerly course till it strikes the Ottawas river; thence it as-



ends that river to the head of lake Temiscaming; and thence proceeds due north till it strikes the southern boundary of New-Britain. From its commencement as far as Temiscaming the course of the boundary is about W. N. W.

**Original Population.**—Various tribes of Knistoneaux Indians occupied the whole country of Lower Canada, at the period when it was settled from Europe. During the American war the Mohawks one of the Six Nations, or Iroquois, removed from the Mohawk river, in New York, and planted themselves in this province.

**Population.**—The number of inhabitants in Lower Canada, in 1783 was by actual enumeration 113,013. The number in 1806 was according to Mr. Herriot, 150,000. In 1811 they were estimated at between 203,000 and 300,000. The greater part of these are descendants of the original French colonists. We are not certain whether the aborigines are included in this estimation; but believe they are not. Their number is probably about 20,000.

**Quebec.**—Is the capital of this province. It stands on a point of land on the N.W. side of the river St. Lawrence, lat. 46, 48 39 N. lon. 71, 12 6 W. at its confluence with the river St. Charles and about 320 miles from the sea, 364 from Boston, 797 from Halifax, 412 from Albany, 180 from Montreal. The town is divided into Upper & Lower. The Upper town stands on a high lime stone rock; is of considerable natural strength, and well fortified. The Lower town is situated upon low land at the foot of the rock, which has been gradually gained from the river. The streets are irregular uneven, narrow and unpaved. The houses are almost universally of stone, small, ugly and inconvenient. The fortifications are extensive but irregular. A large garrison is maintained, but 5000 soldiers would be necessary to man the works. The number of inhabitants, in 1806 was according to Herriot, 15,000. Two thirds of them are French, and the presence of the legislature, the courts, and the garrison renders the town gay and lively. The lower town is inhabited principally by tradesmen and sailors. The rock which separates it from the upper extends with a bold and steep front, a considerable distance westward along the St. Lawrence. The upper town frequently suffers from the scarcity of water, which is always abundant in the lower. The monastries are almost extinct; yet there

are three nunneries. The markets are well supplied, and the little carts are often drawn by dogs. The St. Lawrence opposite the town is only a mile wide. A little below it widens to 4 or 5 leagues, and continues that width to the sea. It forms here a safe and commodious basin for ships, and is from 20 to 25 fathoms deep. If Mr. Herriot's estimate of the population of the town is correct, its growth for some time past has been rapid; for in 1784 it contained only 6,472 inhabitants. The surrounding country presents a most sublime and beautiful scenery; and the banks of the river, between Quebec and Montreal furnish a pleasing succession of neat country seats and flourishing farms.

**Montreal.**—The second city in rank in Lower Canada was originally called *Ville Marie*. It stands on the east side of an island in the river St. Lawrence, which is 20 miles long and 12 broad. In the middle of the island is a high mountain, which the French called *Montreal*, a name which was afterwards transferred to the city and island. The town is 200 miles below lake Ontario, and 180 miles above Quebec, in lat. 43 35, north, lon. 73 11, west, at the head of ship navigation. The St. Lawrence is 3 miles wide at this place. The city forms an oblong square, divided by regular streets, and is surrounded by a strong wall, built by order of Louis XIV. The houses stand on a side hill, and many of them are badly built. Almost every house may be seen at one view from the harbor, or from the south east side of the river. The number of inhabitants in 1809, was estimated at 16,900. The distance of the town from the south-east bank of the river is half a league. The chief trade of the city is in furs; though during the American embargo and since, its foreign trade was very much increased. A regiment of soldiers is stationed here. The British Northwest company which has proved a formidable rival in the fur trade, to the Hudson-bay company, is composed principally of Montreal merchants.

The imposts of Canada antecedent to the conquest by the British in the most flourishing years amounted only to 160,000 sterling, and its exports to 80,000. Only 12 vessels were engaged in the fishery and 6 in the West India trade. The exports at that time consisted wholly of furs and fish. In 1802 the exports exceeded half a million sterling. Besides furs and fish there were exported in that year 1010,000 bushels of wheat, 33,000 barrels of flour, 32,000 cwt. of biscuit, large quantities of potash and considerable quantities of American

ginseng. In the export of these articles 211 vessels were employed, amounting to 36,000 tons. The fur trade and fisheries also have greatly increased.\*

**Climate and Seasons.**—Winter commences early in November, and lasts till April. The cold is so intense that the largest rivers are frozen over, and even the mercury in the thermometer often reduced to a solid state. The ice on the river is usually two feet thick, and that close to the banks of the St. Lawrence called *bordage*, is commonly 6 feet. The snow usually lies from 4 to 6 feet deep. The spring is extremely short and vegetation surprisingly rapid. The thermometer in July and August frequently rises above 80 and sometimes above 90.

\*Quebec Almanac for 1811.

†Quebec Almanac for 1811.

\*The substantial articles of export in 1810 were peltries, lumber, flour, pork, and beef. The vessels cleared in that year were 661. Their tonnage amounted to 143,893; their seamen to 6,578.

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